Investors are unwilling to pay for corporate social responsibility activities: Evidence from India’s Companies Act 2013 by Parinduri, Rasyad & Paul, Saumik
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Investors are unwilling to pay for
corporate social responsibility activities:
Evidence from India’s Companies Act
2013
Rasyad Parinduri and Saumik Paul
Nottingham University Business School, University of Nottingham,
Malaysia Campus
January 2015
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/61360/
MPRA Paper No. 61360, posted 16 January 2015 20:19 UTC
1 
 
Investors are unwilling to pay for corporate social responsibility activities: 
Evidence from India’s Companies Act 2013 
 
 
Rasyad A. Parinduri
a,*
 and Saumik Paul
b 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We examine the effects of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) activities on the values of firms. Using a non-
parametric regression discontinuity design, exploiting a 
natural experiment induced by India’s Companies Act 
2013, we find investors devalue the stocks of firms that do 
CSR activities by 2-5%, which suggests investors are 
unwilling to pay for CSR activities. 
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1. Introduction 
Investors may be unwilling to pay for corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
activities. The conflict resolution view of the CSR literature says managers do 
CSR activities to resolve conflicts among stakeholders, which may increase 
profits (Jo and Harjoto, 2011); the agency view, on the contrary, says 
managers do CSR activities for their own benefits, often at shareholders’ costs 
(Barnea and Rubin, 2010).
1
 Not only that  the theories are debatable, the 
empirical evidence (many of the papers are correlation studies) is also unclear 
on whether CSR activities increase profits or whether investors are willing to 
pay for them (Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012; Margolis et al., 2007). 
 We examine the effects of CSR activities on firm values—how much 
investors revalue the stocks of firms when the firms do CSR activities—using 
a natural experiment induced by India’s Companies Act 2013. The Act 
requires firms whose sales, net worth, or net profits are at least INR 10 billion, 
5 billion, or 50 million, respectively, in the previous financial year to spend 
2% of their average net profits in the three previous years on CSR activities. 
We argue that firms whose sales, net worth, or net profits are within a small 
range around INR 10 billion, 5 billion, or 50 million, respectively, are similar 
on average except that firms above a threshold have to do CSR activities, 
which means the data fit a regression discontinuity design.  
  
                                                          
1
The debate in this literature is whether managers should maximize only 
shareholders’ values (Friedman, 1970; Wartick and Cochran, 1985). 
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2. Empirical strategy and data 
2.1. Empirical strategy 
We compare how investors revalue the stocks of firms that have to do CSR 
activities and those that do not. We focus on how investors behave when the 
2013-14 financial year ends on 31 March 2014, that is when they find out 
which firms that the Act requires to do CSR activities. If we find investors 
revalue the two groups of stocks differently, we can attribute the difference to 
CSR activities.  
We use an event study analysis to examine how investors revalue the 
stocks; then, we use a non-parametric discontinuity design to compare 
investors’ revaluation of the two groups of stocks. In the first stage, we 
estimate a market model, 
 𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽𝑟𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, (1) 
for each stock, where rit is the daily stock returns of stock i at time t, rmt is the 
market returns at time t, and  is the error terms, in an estimation window from 
4 January 2010 to 28 February 2014. Then, we calculate (1) the predicted 
returns,  ?̂?𝑖𝑡, for 5-, 7-, or 15-day event-window around 31 March 2014; (2) the 
daily abnormal return, 𝑟𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑖𝑡, for each trading day in each event window;  
and (3) the corresponding cummulative abnormal returns (CARs), ∑ 𝑟𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑖𝑡. 
In the second stage, we calculate the average CARs of firms that have to do 
CSR activities (𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐶𝑆𝑅) and that of firms that do not (𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑁𝑜 𝐶𝑆𝑅) in a small 
range around a threshold, and we test whether the difference, 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐶𝑆𝑅 −
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𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑁𝑜 𝐶𝑆𝑅,  statistically differs from zero. If investors devalue the stocks of 
firms that have to do CSR activities, we expect the difference to be negative. 
 
2.2. Data 
We get the stock prices of firms listed in the National Stock Exchange of India 
from Datastream on 25 April 2014, four weeks after the 2013-14 financial 
year ends. We calculate daily stock returns from the stock prices and daily 
market returns from the CNX 500 Index.  
We use only sales as the criterion in our analyses. When we 
downloaded the data from Datastream, the net worth of most firms were 
unavailable and net-profits (as defined by the Act) were difficult to calculate 
from the information available in the database. Therefore, because the net 
worth and and net profits were unavailable to investors in March 2014, we can 
use sales as the only criterion without loss of generality.
2
 
 
 
3. Results 
Figure 1,  a scatter-plot of the average CARs by sales, shows that firms whose 
sales are slightly more than INR 10 billion have smaller CARs than firms 
whose sales are slightly less than INR 10 billion do. (Each dot represents the 
average CARs of firms whose sales are within each 0.5-billion range from 
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 Moreover, firms around the sales threshold are comparable if we consider a small 
range of sales around it. 
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INR 5 to 15 billion.) Firms whose sales are slightly to the right of the 
threshold have 3% average CARs and firms slightly to the left have 9%, which 
suggests investors think CSR activities lower firm values. Even when we 
consider firms farther away from the threshold, similar results arise. (For 
example, firms whose sales are within 2 billion above the threshold have about 
3% average CARs and firms below have about 6%.) The trendline of the 
averages, a cubic function of sales that may jump at the threshold, also shows 
similar picture: The average initially increases, but it falls at the threshold.  
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
 Table 1, which presents the estimates of 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐶𝑆𝑅 − 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑁𝑜 𝐶𝑆𝑅 
confirms the picture we see in Figure 1. Almost all estimates are statistically 
significant, especially the estimates in rows 2 and 3 in which we include 2- or 
4-billion range around the threshold. Some estimates in row 1 are statistically 
insignificant perhaps because there are too few firms in the sample so that we 
have insufficent statistical power. (The sampe sizes in rows 1-4 are 40, 101, 
201, and 311, respectively.) The estimate in row 4 and column 3 also has big 
standard errors, though we should cautiously interpret those in row 4 because 
we include firms that are far from the threshold, which may make the firms 
above and below the threshold incomparable. Overall, the estimates suggest 
investors devalue the stocks of firms that have to do CSR activities by 2-5%, a 
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large effect considering that the firms are required to spend only 2% of its net-
profits.
3
 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
 We do some placebo tests using false thresholds, but, as Table 2 
shows, we do not find the average CARs of firms above and below the false 
thresholds differ. Using INR 9 billion as the false threshold,  the estimates of 
the difference in rows 1-3 are positive, perhaps because larger firms have 
bigger CARs; but they are statistically insignificant (Panel A). When we use 
6-billion range around the false INR 9-billion threshold, the estimates are 
negative, though they are very small (less than 0.4 percent) and statistically 
insignificant (row 4). We get similar results when use INR 11 billion as the 
false threshold (Panel B): Most estimates are negative but almost all are 
statistically insignificant (only the estimate in row 7 and column 1 is 
statistically significant). Overall, therefore, the results in Table 1 are robust. 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
The natural experiment induced by India’s Companies Act 2013 shows that 
investors devalue the stocks of firms that have to do CSR activities by 2-5%: 
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 Moreover, CSR activities are like advertising campaigns, which may, to some 
extent, improve firms’ performance. 
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Average investors seem to be unwilling to pay for CSR activities.
4
 The results 
complement correlation studies in the empirical literature on the effects of 
CSR activities on firm values. They seem to be in line with the agency view of 
the CSR literature and Friedman’s (1970) idea that managers’ only social 
responsibility is to increase profits. 
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Figure 1 The average CARs and sales 
 
Notes: Each dot is the average CARs of firms whose sales are within a 0.5-
billion range from INR 5 to 15 billion. The trendline is CARs as a cubic 
function of sales that may jump at the INR 10 billion sales. 
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Table 1  Basic results 
     
    5 days 7 days 15 days 
    (1) (2) (3) 
Range around the INR 10 billion threshold 
  
1 billion  (1) -0.031* -0.086 -0.031 
  
(0.014) (0.044) (0.029) 
2 billion  (2) -0.029** -0.053* -0.043* 
  
(0.010) (0.024) (0.020) 
4 billion  (3) -0.022** -0.033* -0.036* 
  
(0.007) (0.013) (0.015) 
6 billion  (4) -0.015* -0.023* -0.011 
  
(0.006) (0.009) (0.012) 
Notes: The number in each cell is the estimate of the difference between the 
average CARs of firms above and that below the INR 10 billion threshold within 
the range indicated in the left column and the event window indicated in the top 
row. (The sample used in the first row, for example, includes firms whose sales are 
between INR 9.5 and INR 10.5 billion.) The numbers in parentheses are robust 
standard errors. The sampe sizes in rows 1-4 are 40, 101, 201, and 311, 
respectively. The signs * and ** indicate statistical significance at five and one 
percent level, respectively. 
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Table 2 Using false thresholds 
     
    5 days 7 days 15 days 
    (1) (2) (3) 
A. Range around the INR 9 billion threshold 
  
1 billion  (1) 0.020 0.022 0.016 
  
(0.015) (0.017) (0.030) 
2 billion  (2) 0.016 0.038 0.012 
  
(0.010) (0.024) (0.020) 
4 billion  (3) 0.005 0.012 0.011 
  
(0.007) (0.013) (0.014) 
6 billion  (4) -0.004 0.00002 -0.002 
  
(0.006) (0.010) (0.012) 
B. Range around the INR 11 billion threshold 
  
1 billion  (5) -0.018 -0.020 0.005 
  
(0.011) (0.016) (0.031) 
2 billion  (6) -0.004 -0.001 0.003 
  
(0.010) (0.013) (0.022) 
4 billion  (7) -0.015* -0.023 -0.009 
  
(0.007) (0.014) (0.016) 
6 billion  (8) -0.012 -0.014 -0.009 
  
(0.006) (0.010) (0.012) 
Notes: The number in each cell is the estimate of the difference between the average 
CARs of firms above and that below a false threshold. See the notes to Table 1. 
 
 
